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  When to Leave Carrots for Sticks: On the Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions in Open Communities

Chugunova, M., Luhan, W., & Nicklisch, A. (2020). When to Leave Carrots for Sticks: On the Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions in Open Communities. Economics Letters, 191: 109155. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109155.

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Genre: Zeitschriftenartikel

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Also published as: Working Paper Nr. 2017-09 on the DFG Research Group 2104
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 Urheber:
Chugunova, Marina1, Autor           
Luhan, Wolfgang2, Autor
Nicklisch, Andreas2, Autor
Affiliations:
1MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society, ou_2035292              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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Schlagwörter: open communities, Voting with Feet, cooperation, sanctions, public goods
 Zusammenfassung: When asked, people dislike punishment institutions, although punishment is more effective than rewards to maintain cooperation in social dilemmas. Which institution do they choose in the long run? We study migration patterns in a laboratory experiment that allows participants to migrate continuously between punishment and reward communities. The majority of participants initially chooses the reward institution, but a substantial number of subjects joins the less profitable punishment community subsequently. In this case, the mere threat of punishment establishes high contributions. Income differences and missing compensations for cooperators in the reward community are the key factors for the decision to migrate.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2020
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
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 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109155
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Titel: Economics Letters
  Kurztitel : Econ. Lett.
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
 Urheber:
Affiliations:
Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Amsterdam : North-Holland
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 191 Artikelnummer: 109155 Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ISSN: 0165-1765
ZDB: 717210-2
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/954925481602