ausblenden:
Schlagwörter:
Endogeneity, Voting, Institutions, Social dilemma, Public good, Inherited rules
JEL:
C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
JEL:
D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
JEL:
D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
JEL:
D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
JEL:
H41 - Public Goods
Zusammenfassung:
We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, we find no positive effect of the democratic procedural history on cooperation when the institution is implemented. Yet, the vote-based rejection of the institution leads to (marginally) less cooperation in the second generation.
