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  Evolutionary games in the multiverse

Gokhale, C. S., & Traulsen, A. (2010). Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(12), 5500-5504. doi:10.1073/pnas.0912214107.

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 Urheber:
Gokhale, Chaitanya S.1, Autor           
Traulsen, Arne1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Schlagwörter: evolutionary dynamics; multiplayer games; multiple strategies replicator dynamics; finite populations
 Zusammenfassung: Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players Graphic with any number of strategies Graphic, there can be at most Graphic isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2010-03-23
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
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 Identifikatoren: eDoc: 474673
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0912214107
Anderer: 2748/S 39078
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Titel: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Alternativer Titel : PNAS
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Seiten: - Band / Heft: 107 (12) Artikelnummer: - Start- / Endseite: 5500 - 5504 Identifikator: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)