ausblenden:
Schlagwörter:
Vertical Restraints, Retail Investment, Marketing, Interbrand Competition, Intrabrand Competition,
iPhone
Zusammenfassung:
This paper studies the equilibrium incentives of an upstream manufacturer to adopt exclusive retailing
(ER). ER eliminates disciplining intrabrand competition between retailers, gives the exclusive retailer
market power and a higher retail margin. On the one hand, the additional margin gives the exclusive
retailer larger incentives to invest in (procompetitive) brand-specific marketing. On the other hand, ER
may serve as a (anticompetitive) commitment device for reduced interbrand competition and hence,
higher prices and profits. Implications for competition policy are ambiguous. Whenever marketing
investments play a prominent role or interbrand competition is rather tough, ER enhances welfare.
Otherwise regulators should intervene.
