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  Tax Morale and Fairness in Conflict - An Experiment

Engel, C., Mittone, L., & Morreale, A. (2019). Tax Morale and Fairness in Conflict - An Experiment.

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Datensatz-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-0BB2-8 Versions-Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-34D2-5
Genre: Forschungspapier

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externe Referenz:
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2019_02online.pdf (beliebiger Volltext)
Beschreibung:
Arguably, for many citizens the perceived expected disutility from sanctions is smaller than the monetary gain from tax evasion. Nevertheless most people pay their taxes most of the time. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes even absent enforcement is indeed pronounced. Yet voluntary compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.
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Urheber

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 Urheber:
Engel, Christoph1, Autor           
Mittone, Luigi, Autor
Morreale, Azzurra, Autor
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Inhalt

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Schlagwörter: tax evasion, tax morale, heterogeneity, income inequality, lump sum tax, proportional tax, progressive tax, beliefs, path model
 JEL: C30 - General
 JEL: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
 JEL: D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
 JEL: D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
 JEL: D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
 JEL: D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
 JEL: D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
 JEL: H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
 JEL: K34 - Tax Law
 JEL: K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
 Zusammenfassung: -

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Sprache(n):
 Datum: 2019-02
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
 Seiten: -
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2019/2
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: Anderer: 2019/02
 Art des Abschluß: -

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