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  Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict

Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2011). Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-07.

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881550 (Preprint)
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 Creators:
Konrad, Kai A.1, Author           
Morath, Florian1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              

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Free keywords: Altruism, spite, in-group favoritism, conflict, evolutionary stability, indirect evolutionary approach
 Abstract: We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2011-07-08
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 20
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
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Title: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Source Genre: Series
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 2011-07 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -