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Language(s):
eng - English
Dates:
2019-09-092019
Publication Status:
Issued
Pages:
xii, 198
Publishing info:
Cologne : University of Cologne
Table of Contents:
Tables, Figures, and Photos
ABSTRACT
1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION*
1.1. Comparative cases
1.2. Method and fieldwork
1.3. Contributions and output
1.4. Plan
2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK*
2.1. The party and the party systems
2.2. The dominant party and the predominant party system
2.3. Predominant party systems versus hegemonic party systems
2.4. Predominant party systems and political regimes
3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORY
3.1. Institutional theories
3.1.1. Gerrymandering
3.2. Social cleavage theory
3.3. Decision-theoretic model
3.4. Performance legitimacy theory
3.5. Resource theory
3.5.1. Clientelism
3.5.2. Clientelism in Turkish politics: The past
3.5.3. Clientelism under AKP governments
4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN TURKEY
4.1. Defining party system change
4.2. 1923‒1950: One-party authoritarianism
4.3. 1950‒60: From the predominant party system to the hegemonic party system
4.4. 1961‒1980: Polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage
4.5. 1983‒2002: Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages
4.6. 2002‒2015: Predominant party system
5. CHAPTER FIVE: AKP
5.1. The rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey
5.2. AKP
5.2.1. AKP’s flirtation with the global order: neoliberalism at the climax
5.2.2. AKP and political Islam: Cyclical moderation
5.3. Elections
5.3.1. 2002–2007: The good old days
5.3.2. 2007–2011: Consolidation of power
5.3.3. 2011–2015: The “New Turkey”
5.3.4. From June to November 2015: The fall and the rise of the AKP
6. CHAPTER SIX: FIELDWORK
6.1. Method
6.2. Scope and significance
6.3. Case selection: Bağcılar
6.3.1. Parties and elections in Bağcılar
6.4. From the ‘social democrats’ to the ‘Islamists’: Clientelism during the 1990s
6.5. The demand side: the poor
6.6. The supply side: Patrons
6.6.1. Party
6.6.2. Municipality
6.6.3. Leader
6.6.4. Religious groups, vaqfs and loyal businessmen
6.7. The content of clientelist exchange
6.8. Exclusion
6.9. Deterring exit: monitoring and punishment
6.10. Swing vs. core voters
6.11. Causal mechanisms
6.11.1. Strengthening partisan identification
6.11.2. Change in ideology
7. CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARISON
7.1. Mexico
7.2. Taiwan
7.3. India
7.4. Japan
8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
APPENDIX I: Interview guide
APPENDIX II: The list of interviews
REFERENCES
Rev. Type:
-
Degree:
PhD
