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employers; multilevel governance; varieties of capitalism; Germany; United Kingdom; European Union; takeover regulation; worker participation
Abstract:
Why does the willingness of interest groups to join forces with their peers abroad vary across issues? The present article points to cross-issue variation in the “constrain-thy-neighbor” effects of transnational law. Interest groups consider not only whether they are worse off if they themselves are subjected to a transnational law. They also consider how it affects them if the same law applies abroad. Depending on the issue, they derive advantages or disadvantages from seeing their neighbors constrained, and this affects their willingness to fight transnational legislation on that issue. To illustrate the argument, the article compares cohesion within the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European peak employer federation, on two aspects of EU company law. UNICE members were divided over EU takeover directives while uniting against EU worker participation directives. Statements released by German and British UNICE members show that the divergent constrain-thy-neighbor effect associated with these issues contributed to variation in cohesion.
