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  No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself?

Scharpf, F. W. (2005). No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself? MPIfG Working Paper, 05/8.

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 Creators:
Scharpf, Fritz W.1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Globale Strukturen und ihre Steuerung, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214547              

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 Abstract: The unique institutions that make up Germany's "unitary federal state," long considered part of the country's post-war success story, are now generally perceived as a "joint-decision trap" impeding effective policy responses to new economic and demographic challenges at both levels of government. Nevertheless, a high-powered bicameral Commission set up in the fall of 2003 failed to reach agreement on constitutional reforms. The paper analyzes the misguided procedural and substantive choices that led to this failure, and it discusses the possibility of asymmetric constitutional solutions that might enhance the capacity for autonomous action at both levels.
 Abstract: Die im internationalen Vergleich einmaligen Institutionen des "unitarischen Bundesstaats" erschienen lange as Element der deutschen Erfolgsgeschichte in der Nachkriegszeit. Heute erscheinen sie jedoch als "Politikverflechtungsfalle," welche die Politik in Bund und Ländern an der Bewältigung der neuen ökonomischen und demographischen Herausforderungen hindert. Trotzdem gelang es einer im Herbst 2003 eingesetzten und politisch potent besetzten gemeinsamen Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat nicht, sich auf eine Verfassungsreform zu einigen. Der Text analysiert die prozeduralen und sachlichen Fehlentscheidungen, die das Scheitern erklären, und er erörtert die Möglichkeit asymmetrischer Lösungen, die den Spielraum für autonomes politisches Handeln auf beiden staatlichen Ebenen erweitern könnten.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2005-08
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: 28
 Publishing info: Köln : Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
 Table of Contents: 1 Why the need for reform?
1.1 The evolution of the joint-decision system
1.2 The joint-decision trap
1.3 A window of opportunity?
2 The Commission for the Modernization of the Federal Constitution
3 What was agreed and why did it fail?
3.1 The Bundesrat veto
3.2 The Constitutional Court changed the agenda
3.3 Conflicts among the Länder
3.4 The impasse over education: All or nothing at all?
4 Future options
5 Toward an asymmetric German federalism?
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 Rev. Type: Internal
 Identifiers: eDoc: 271875
 Degree: -

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Title: MPIfG Working Paper
Source Genre: Series
 Creator(s):
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Editor              
Affiliations:
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Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 05/8 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 1864-4341
ISSN: 1864-4333