Low Trust and High Trust Equilibria in Politics - Political Corruption and 
Party Patronage as Coordination Game

Manow, Philip

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Low Trust and High Trust Equilibria in Politics - Political Corruption and Party Patronage as Coordination Game

Manow, P. (2003). Low Trust and High Trust Equilibria in Politics - Political Corruption and Party Patronage as Coordination Game. In H.-P. Burth, & T. Plümper (Eds.), Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie (pp. 7-31). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-517A-1 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-517B-0

Genre: Contribution to Collected Edition

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Creators:
Manow, Philip¹, Author

Affiliations:
1Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214551

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Language(s): eng - English

Dates: Date issued: 2003

Publication Status: Issued

Pages: -

Publishing info: Opladen : Leske + Budrich

Table of Contents: -

Rev. Type: -

Identifiers: eDoc: 113878

Degree: -

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Title: Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie

Source Genre: Collected Edition

Creator(s):
Burth, Hans-Peter, Editor
Plümper, Thomas¹, Editor

Affiliations:
1 Projektbereiche vor 1997, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society, ou_1214553

Publ. Info: Opladen : Leske + Budrich

Pages: - Volume / Issue: - Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 7 - 31 Identifier: -