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  Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game

Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2011). Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-16.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-46C4-F Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-46C6-B
Genre: Paper

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1945211 (Preprint)
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 Creators:
Tan, Fangfang1, Author              
Xiao, Erte2, Author
Affiliations:
1Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society, ou_830552              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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Free keywords: Social dilemmas, third party, punishment, cooperation, experiment
 Abstract: This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on promoting cooperation when antisocial punishment proposals are rare.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2011-10-17
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 17
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

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Title: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Source Genre: Series
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 2011-16 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: -