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  From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive

Traulsen, A., & Reed, F. A. (2012). From genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 299, 120-125. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032.

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Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Reed, Floyd A.2, Author              
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1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              
2Research Group Population Genetics, Department Evolutionary Genetics, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445646              

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Free keywords: evolutionary dynamics; population genetics; evolutionary gametheory; genotype; phenotype
 Abstract: Evolutionary change can be described on a genotypic level or a phenotypic level. Evolutionary game theory is typically thought of as a phenotypic approach, although it is frequently argued that it can also be used to describe population genetic evolution. Interpreting the interaction between alleles in a diploid genome as a two player game leads to interesting alternative perspectives on genetic evolution. Here we focus on the case of meiotic drive and illustrate how meiotic drive can be directly and precisely interpreted as a social dilemma, such as the prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, in which the drive allele takes more than its fair share. Resistance to meiotic drive can lead to the well understood cyclic dominance found in the rock–paper–scissors game. This perspective is well established for the replicator dynamics, but there is still considerable ground for mutual inspiration between the two fields. For example, evolutionary game theorists can benefit from considering the stochastic evolutionary dynamics arising from finite population size. Population geneticists can benefit from game theoretic tools and perspectives on genetic evolution.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2012-04-21
 Publication Status: Published in print
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 Identifiers: eDoc: 608951
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032
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Title: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 299 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 120 - 125 Identifier: ISSN: 0022-5193 (print)
ISSN: 1095-8541 (online)