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  A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure

Zschaler, G., Traulsen, A., & Gross, T. (2010). A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure. New Journal of Physics, 12: 093015. doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093015.

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Zschaler_NJP_2009.pdf (Publisher version), 976KB
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 Creators:
Zschaler, Gerd, Author
Traulsen, Arne1, Author           
Gross, Thilo, Author
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1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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 Abstract: We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents (cooperation or defection)feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff and undermines the evolution of cooperation. Although no a priori advantage is given to cooperators, an intrinsic dynamical mechanism can lead asymptotically to a state of full cooperation. In finite systems, this state is characterized by long periods of strong cooperation interrupted by sudden episodes of predominant defection, suggesting a possible mechanism for the systemic failure of cooperation in realworld systems.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2010-09-10
 Publication Status: Issued
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 Identifiers: eDoc: 499424
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093015
Other: 2783/S 39121
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Title: New Journal of Physics
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 12 Sequence Number: 093015 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 1367-2630