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  Human strategy updating in evolutionary games

Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2010). Human strategy updating in evolutionary games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(7), 2962-2966. doi:10.1073/pnas.0912515107.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D4C2-C Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D4C3-A
Genre: Journal Article

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Traulsen_2010.pdf (Publisher version), 248KB
 
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 Creators:
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Semmann, Dirk2, Author              
Sommerfeld, Ralf D.2, Author              
Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen3, Author              
Milinski, Manfred2, Author              
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              
2Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              
3Department Ecophysiology, Max Planck Institute for Limnology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_976547              

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Free keywords: update mechanisms; cooperation; finite populations; structured populations
 Abstract: Evolutionary game dynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in theoretical models and, for example, can significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dilemmas. What kind of strategy update rules can describe imitation dynamics in humans? Here, we present a way to measure such strategy update rules in a behavioral experiment. We use a setting in which individuals are virtually arranged on a spatial lattice. This produces a large number of different strategic situations from which we can assess strategy updating. Most importantly, spontaneous strategy changes corresponding to mutations or exploration behavior are more frequent than assumed in many models. Our experimental approach to measure properties of the update mechanisms used in theoretical models will be useful for mathematical models of cultural evolution.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2010-02-16
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
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 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: eDoc: 474672
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107
Other: 2746/S 39076
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Title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Alternative Title : PNAS
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 107 (7) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 2962 - 2966 Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)