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  Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity

Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M. (2007). Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104(44), 17435-17440. doi:10.1073/pnas.0704598104.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D755-A Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D756-8
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Sommerfeld, Ralf D.1, Author              
Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen2, Author              
Semmann, Dirk1, Author              
Milinski, Manfred1, Author              
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1Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              
2Department Ecophysiology, Max Planck Institute for Limnology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_976547              

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Free keywords: cooperation; reputation; language; manipulation
 Abstract: Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2007-10
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: eDoc: 330169
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0704598104
Other: 2580/S 38738
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Title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Alternative Title : PNAS
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 104 (44) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 17435 - 17440 Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424