English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game

Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2003). Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game. Nature, 425(6956), 390-393.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-DBB1-9 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-DBB2-7
Genre: Journal Article

Files

show Files
hide Files
:
semmann_2003.pdf (Publisher version), 199KB
 
File Permalink:
-
Name:
semmann_2003.pdf
Description:
-
Visibility:
Restricted (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön; )
MIME-Type / Checksum:
application/pdf
Technical Metadata:
Copyright Date:
-
Copyright Info:
-
License:
-

Locators

show

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Semmann, Dirk1, Author              
Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen2, Author              
Milinski, Manfred1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              
2Department Ecophysiology, Max Planck Institute for Limnology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_976547              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: Collective efforts are a trademark of both insect and human societies(1). They are achieved through relatedness in the former(2) and unknown mechanisms in the latter. The problem of achieving cooperation among non-kin has been described as the 'tragedy of the commons', prophesying the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises(3,4). In public goods experiments, initial cooperation usually drops quickly to almost zero(5). It can be maintained by the opportunity to punish defectors(6) or the need to maintain good reputation(7). Both schemes require that defectors are identified. Theorists propose that a simple but effective mechanism operates under full anonymity. With optional participation in the public goods game, 'loners' (players who do not join the group), defectors and cooperators will coexist through rock-paper-scissors dynamics(8,9). Here we show experimentally that volunteering generates these dynamics in public goods games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction. If, by manipulating displayed decisions, it is pretended that defectors have the highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after loners and defectors after cooperators. On average, cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2003-09-25
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: Peer
 Identifiers: eDoc: 49850
Other: 2231/S 37988
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Nature
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: -
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 425 (6956) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 390 - 393 Identifier: ISSN: 0028-0836