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  Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutants

Huang, W., Haubold, B., Hauert, C., & Traulsen, A. (2012). Emergence of stable polymorphisms driven by evolutionary games between mutants. Nature Communications, 3: 919. doi:10.1038/ncomms1930.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-E907-9 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-0003-3AB5-0
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Huang, Weini1, Author              
Haubold, Bernhard2, Author              
Hauert, Christoph, Author
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              
2Research Group Bioinformatics, Department Evolutionary Genetics, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445644              

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 Abstract: Under neutrality, polymorphisms are maintained through the balance between mutation and drift. Under selection, a variety of mechanisms may be involved in the maintenance of polymorphisms, for example, sexual selection or host-parasite coevolution on the population level or heterozygote advantage in diploid individuals. Here we address the emergence of polymorphisms in a population of interacting haploid individuals. In our model, each mutation generates a new evolutionary game characterized by a payoff matrix with an additional row and an additional column. Hence, in general, the fitness of new mutations is frequency-dependent rather than constant. This dynamical process is distinct from the sequential fixation of advantageous traits and naturally leads to the emergence of polymorphisms under selection. It causes substantially higher diversity than observed under the established models of neutral or frequency-independe

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2012-02-222012-05-282012-06-26
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 7 p.
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 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1038/ncomms1930
Other: 2937/S 39282
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Title: Nature Communications
  Abbreviation : Nat Commun
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: London : Nature Publishing Group
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 3 Sequence Number: 919 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 2041-1723 (online)