English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
 
 
DownloadE-Mail
  Evolutionary dynamics of strategic behavior in a collective-risk dilemma

Abou Chakra, M., & Traulsen, A. (2012). Evolutionary dynamics of strategic behavior in a collective-risk dilemma. PLoS Computational Biology, 8(8): e1002652. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002652.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-EFC7-3 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-EFC8-1
Genre: Journal Article

Files

show Files
hide Files
:
Abou Chakra_2012.pdf (Publisher version), 623KB
Name:
Abou Chakra_2012.pdf
Description:
-
Visibility:
Public
MIME-Type / Checksum:
application/pdf / [MD5]
Technical Metadata:
Copyright Date:
-
Copyright Info:
-
License:
-

Locators

show

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Abou Chakra, Maria1, Author              
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: A collective-risk social dilemma arises when a group must cooperate to reach a common target in order to avoid the risk of collective loss while each individual is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. In contrast to the prisoners’ dilemma or public goods games, the collective-risk dilemma encompasses the risk that all individuals lose everything. These characteristics have potential relevance for dangerous climate change and other risky social dilemmas. Cooperation is costly to the individual and it only benefits all individuals if the common target is reached. An individual thus invests without guarantee that the investment is worthwhile for anyone. If there are several subsequent stages of investment, it is not clear when individuals should contribute. For example, they could invest early, thereby signaling their willingness to cooperate in the future, constantly invest their fair share, or wait and compensate missing contributions. To investigate the strategic behavior in such situations, we have simulated the evolutionary dynamics of such collective-risk dilemmas in a finite population. Contributions depend individually on the stage of the game and on the sum of contributions made so far. Every individual takes part in many games and successful behaviors spread in the population. It turns out that constant contributors, such as constant fair sharers, quickly lose out against those who initially do not contribute, but compensate this in later stages of the game. In particular for high risks, such late contributors are favored.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2012-02-222012-06-242012-08-23
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002652
Other: 2948/S 39293
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: PLoS Computational Biology
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: San Francisco, CA : Public Library of Science
Pages: 7 p. Volume / Issue: 8 (8) Sequence Number: e1002652 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 1553-734X (print)
ISSN: 1553-7358 (online)
CoNE: /journals/resource/1000000000017180_1