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  Active linking in evolutionary games

Pacheco, J. M., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). Active linking in evolutionary games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 243(3), 437-443. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.027.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0010-1005-9 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0010-1006-7
Genre: Journal Article

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Pacheco, Jorge M.1, Author
Traulsen, Arne2, Author              
Nowak, Martin A.1, Author
Affiliations:
1external, ou_persistent22              
2External, ou_persistent22              

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 Abstract: In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates. In a limiting case, the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation of the payoff matrix. We outline conditions for evolutionary stability. As a specific example, we study the interaction between cooperators and defectors. We find a simple relationship that characterizes those linking dynamics which allow natural selection to favour cooperation over defection. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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 Dates: 20062006
 Publication Status: Published in print
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Title: Journal of Theoretical Biology
  Other : J. Theor. Biol.
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: London : Academic Press
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 243 (3) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 437 - 443 Identifier: ISSN: 0022-5193
CoNE: /journals/resource/954922646048