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  Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games

Wu, B., García, J., Hauert, C., & Traulsen, A. (2013). Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games. PLoS Computational Biology, 9(12): e1003381. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0014-C5D7-8 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0014-C5D8-6
Genre: Journal Article

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Wu, Bin1, Author              
García, Julián1, Author              
Hauert, Christoph, Author
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
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1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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 Abstract: In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By ‘‘qualitatively valid’’ we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies n. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for n§8, which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2013-08-092013-10-222013-12-05
 Publication Status: Published online
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 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381
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Title: PLoS Computational Biology
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: San Francisco, CA : Public Library of Science
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 9 (12) Sequence Number: e1003381 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 1553-734X (print)
ISSN: 1553-7358 (online)
CoNE: /journals/resource/1000000000017180_1