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Free keywords:
complex networks; social evolution
Abstract:
Consensus is widely observed in nature as well as in society. Up to now, many works have focused on what
kind of (and how) isolated single structures lead to consensus, while the dynamics of consensus in
interdependent populations remains unclear, although interactive structures are everywhere. For such
consensus in interdependent populations, we refer that the fraction of population adopting a specified
strategy is the same across different interactive structures. A two-strategy game as a conflict is adopted to
explore how natural selection affects the consensus in such interdependent populations. It is shown that
when selection is absent, all the consensus states are stable, but none are evolutionarily stable. In other
words, the final consensus state can go back and forth from one to another. When selection is present, there
is only a small number of stable consensus state which are evolutionarily stable. Our study highlights the
importance of evolution on stabilizing consensus in interdependent populations.
