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  Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma

Hilbe, C., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2014). Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma. Nature Communications, 5: 3976. doi:10.1038/ncomms4976.

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 Urheber:
Hilbe, Christian1, Autor           
Röhl, Torsten1, Autor           
Milinski, Manfred2, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              
2Department Evolutionary Ecology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445634              

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 Zusammenfassung: Extortion is the practice of obtaining advantages through explicit forces and threats. Recently, it was demonstrated that even the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, one of the key models to explain mutual cooperation, allows for implicit forms of extortion. According to the theory, extortioners demand and receive an excessive share of any surplus, which allows them to outperform any adapting co-player. To explore the performance of such strategies against humans, we have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched either with an extortioner or with a generous co-player. Although extortioners succeeded against each of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity. Human subjects showed a strong concern for fairness: they punished extortion by refusing to fully cooperate, thereby reducing their own, and even more so, the extortioner’s gains. Thus, the prospects of extorting others in social relationships seem limited; in the long run, generosity is more profitable.

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Sprache(n): eng - English
 Datum: 2014-02-142014-04-252014-05-29
 Publikationsstatus: Online veröffentlicht
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 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: -
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 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4976
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Titel: Nature Communications
  Kurztitel : Nat. Commun.
Genre der Quelle: Zeitschrift
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Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: London : Nature Publishing Group
Seiten: - Band / Heft: 5 Artikelnummer: 3976 Start- / Endseite: - Identifikator: ISSN: 2041-1723
CoNE: https://pure.mpg.de/cone/journals/resource/2041-1723