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  Climate collective risk dilemma with feedback of real-time temperatures

Du, J., Wu, B., & Wang, L. (2014). Climate collective risk dilemma with feedback of real-time temperatures. EPL, 107(6): 60005. doi:10.1209/0295-5075/107/60005.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0023-ED13-8 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0023-FBF1-3
Genre: Journal Article

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Du_et_al_2014.pdf (Publisher version), 1MB
 
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 Creators:
Du, Jinming, Author
Wu, Bin1, Author              
Wang, Long, Author
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Free keywords: decision theory and game theory; dynamics of evolution; dynamics of social systems
 Abstract: Controlling global warming through collective cooperation is a non-optional threshold public goods game. Previous models assume that the disaster is a sudden event and it happens with a given probability. It is shown that high risk can pave the way for reaching the cooperative target. These models, however, neglect the temperature dynamics, which is influenced by the collective behaviours. Here, we establish a temperature dynamics, and introduce the feedback between human strategy updating and the temperature change: high temperature will discount individuals' payoffs; while sufficient public goods may decrease the ever-rising temperature. We investigate how the temperature is affected by human behaviour and vice versa. It is found that, on the one hand, the temperature can be stabilized to a relatively safe level in the long run. On the other hand, the cooperation can be promoted and be maintained at a higher level, compared with public goods game models with no such feedback.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2014-06-032014-09-012014-09-19
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/107/60005
 Degree: -

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Title: EPL
  Other : Europhysics Letters
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: Bristol : IoPP
Pages: 6 S. Volume / Issue: 107 (6) Sequence Number: 60005 Start / End Page: - Identifier: ISSN: 0295-5075 (print)
ISSN: 1286-4854 (online)
CoNE: /journals/resource/0295-5075