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  Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas

Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2014). Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111(46), 16425-16430. doi:10.1073/pnas.1407887111.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0024-0777-9 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0024-CB74-2
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Hilbe, Christian1, Author              
Wu, Bin1, Author              
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Nowak, Martin A., Author
Affiliations:
1Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Free keywords: evolutionary game theory; alliances; public goods game; volunteer’s dilemma; cooperation
 Abstract: Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. However, in large groups, these mechanisms may become ineffective because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here, we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for iterated multiplayer social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average. We use this theory to describe strategies that sustain cooperation, including generalized variants of Tit-for-Tat and Win-Stay Lose-Shift. Moreover, we explore two models that show how individuals can further enhance their strategic options by coordinating their play with others. Our results highlight the importance of individual control and coordination to succeed in large groups.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2014-10-272014-11-18
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1407887111
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Title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Other : Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: National Academy of Sciences
Pages: 6 S. Volume / Issue: 111 (46) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 16425 - 16430 Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)
CoNE: /journals/resource/954925427230