ausblenden:
Schlagwörter:
evolutionary game theory; alliances; public goods game; volunteer’s dilemma; cooperation
Zusammenfassung:
Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms
to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. However, in large
groups, these mechanisms may become ineffective because they require
single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers.
However, the recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies in the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated
the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here,
we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for iterated multiplayer
social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We
distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair
strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of
the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above
average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average.
We use this theory to describe strategies that sustain cooperation, including
generalized variants of Tit-for-Tat and Win-Stay Lose-Shift.
Moreover, we explore two models that show how individuals can
further enhance their strategic options by coordinating their play with
others. Our results highlight the importance of individual control and
coordination to succeed in large groups.
