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  Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games

Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2015). Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 374, 115-124. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0026-C206-E Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0027-A662-F
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Hilbe, Christian, Author
Wu, Bin1, Author              
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Nowak, Martin A., Author
Affiliations:
1Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

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Free keywords: Cooperation Repeatedgames Zero-determinant strategies; Evolutionary game theory; Public goods game; cooperation
 Abstract: Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2015-03-122014-12-292015-03-242015-04-03
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032
 Degree: -

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Title: Journal of Theoretical Biology
  Other : J. Theor. Biol.
Source Genre: Journal
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Publ. Info: London : Academic Press
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 374 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 115 - 124 Identifier: ISSN: 0022-5193
CoNE: /journals/resource/954922646048