English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations

Huang, W., Hauert, C., & Traulsen, A. (2015). Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112(29), 9064-9069. doi:10.1073/pnas.1418745112.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0027-B19F-A Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-3125-2
Genre: Journal Article

Files

show Files
hide Files
:
Huang_Huert_Traulsen_2015_pnas.pdf (Publisher version), 2MB
Name:
Huang_Huert_Traulsen_2015_pnas.pdf
Description:
Freely available online through the PNAS open access option.
Visibility:
Public
MIME-Type / Checksum:
application/pdf / [MD5]
Technical Metadata:
Copyright Date:
-
Copyright Info:
-
License:
-

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Huang, Weini1, Author              
Hauert, Christoph, Author
Traulsen, Arne1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society, ou_1445641              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: evolutionary games; stochastic dynamics; changing population size
 Abstract: Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on interactions between individuals within the population. This should be reflected in fluctuations of the population size even in constant environments. Here, we propose a stochastic model, which naturally combines these two evolutionary ingredients by assuming frequency dependent competition between different types in an individual-based model. In contrast to previous game theoretic models, the carrying capacity of the population and thus the population size is determined by pairwise competition of individuals mediated by evolutionary games and demographic stochasticity. In the limit of infinite population size, the averaged stochastic dynamics is captured by the deterministic competitive Lotka-Volterra equations. In small populations, demographic stochasticity may instead lead to the extinction of the entire population. As the population size is driven by the fitness in evolutionary games, a population of cooperators is less prone to go extinct than a population of defectors, whereas in the usual systems of fixed size, the population would thrive regardless of its average payoff.

Details

show
hide
Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2014-09-292015-06-112015-07-062015-07-21
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1418745112
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  Other : Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
Source Genre: Journal
 Creator(s):
Affiliations:
Publ. Info: National Academy of Sciences
Pages: - Volume / Issue: 112 (29) Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 9064 - 9069 Identifier: ISSN: 0027-8424 (print)
ISSN: 1091-6490 (online)
CoNE: /journals/resource/954925427230