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  Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues

Hellwig, M., & Bester, H. (1987). Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues. In G. Bamberg, & K. Spremann (Eds.), Agency Theory, Information and Incentives (pp. 135-166). Heidelberg: Springer.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6A56-B Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6A57-9
Genre: Book Chapter

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 Creators:
Hellwig, Martin1, Author              
Bester, Helmut, Author
Bamberg, G., Editor
Spremann, K., Editor
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Dates: 1987
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Method: -
 Identifiers: -
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Title: Agency Theory, Information and Incentives
Source Genre: Book
 Creator(s):
Bamberg, G., Editor
Spremann, K., Editor
Affiliations:
-
Publ. Info: Heidelberg : Springer
Pages: - Volume / Issue: - Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 135 - 166 Identifier: -