English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

Hellwig, M., & Gale, D. (2003). Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem. In J. J. Laffont (Ed.), The principal agent mode. The eonomic theory of incentives (pp. 433-449). Cheltenham: Elgar.

Item is

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6A5E-C Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6A5F-A
Genre: Book Chapter

Files

show Files

Locators

show

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Hellwig, Martin1, Author              
Gale, Douglas, Author
Laffont, J. J., Editor
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2003
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: -
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show
hide
Title: The principal agent mode. The eonomic theory of incentives
Source Genre: Book
 Creator(s):
Laffont, J. J., Editor
Affiliations:
-
Publ. Info: Cheltenham : Elgar
Pages: - Volume / Issue: - Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 433 - 449 Identifier: -