Divergent Platforms

Bade, Sophie

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Divergent Platforms

Bade, S. (2011). Divergent Platforms.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6C91-4 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6C92-2

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1946736 (Any fulltext)

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_25online.pdf (Preprint)

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Bade, Sophie¹, Author

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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Abstract: A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, purely office-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I this short note, I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different platforms in equilibrium even though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.

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Dates: Published in Print: 2011

Publication Status: Published in print

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Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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Identifiers: Other: 2011/25

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