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  Divergent Platforms

Bade, S. (2011). Divergent Platforms.

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1946736 (beliebiger Volltext)
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 Urheber:
Bade, Sophie1, Autor           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Zusammenfassung: A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, purely office-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I this short note, I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different platforms in equilibrium even though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters’ preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.

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 Datum: 2011
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
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 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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 Identifikatoren: Anderer: 2011/25
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