English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
  Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange

Bade, S. (2011). Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Bade, Sophie1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: A version of the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics that applies to a money-free environment, in which a set of indivisible goods needs to be matched to some set of agents, is established. In such environments, "trade" can be identi fied with the set of hierarchical exchange mechanisms de ned by Papai (2000). Papai (2000)'s result – that any such mechanism yields Pareto-optimal allocations – can be interpreted as a version of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for the given environment. In this note, I show that for any Pareto-optimal allocation and any hierarchical exchange mechanism one can nd an initial allocation of ownership rights, such that the given Pareto-optimal allocation arises as a result of trade.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2011
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2011/11
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show