English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
Add to Basket
 Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary
  A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation

Bierbrauer, F. (2008). A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation.

Item is

 

show all hide all

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6CC5-1 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6CC6-0
Genre: Paper

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2008_39online.pdf (Preprint)
Description:
-
OA-Status:

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Bierbrauer, Felix1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: <p>We study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Adding a requirement of coalition-proofness yields a set of collective incentive conditions which are akin those in the literature on public goods provision under private information on preferences, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).</p>

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2008
 Publication Status: Issued
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2008/39
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show