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  Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information

Eguia, J. X., Llorente-Saguer, A., Morton, R., & Nicolò, A. (2014). Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6D25-0 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6D26-E
Genre: Paper

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2014_04online.pdf (Preprint)
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 Creators:
Eguia, Jon X., Author
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol1, Author              
Morton, Rebecca, Author
Nicolò, Antonio, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profi…le that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct experiments to test the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in two applications: a game of vertical multi-lateral contracting, and a game of electoral competition. We fi…nd that our selection criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.

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 Dates: 2014
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2014/04
 Degree: -

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