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  Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence

Engel, C. (2007). Tacit Collusion. The Neglected Experimental Evidence.

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 Urheber:
Engel, Christoph1, Autor           
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Schlagwörter: D21, D43, K21, L13, L41 Oligopoly, Coordinated Effects, Tacit Collusion, Merger Guidelines, Airtours, Experimental Markets
 Zusammenfassung: Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" becomes disturbingly more likely. It seems that antitrust neglects the fact that, for more than 50 years, economists have been doing experiments on this very question. Almost any conceivable determinant of higher or lower collusion has been tested. This paper standardises the evidence by way of a meta-study, and relates experimental findings as closely as possible to antitrust doctrine.

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 Datum: 2007
 Publikationsstatus: Erschienen
 Seiten: 21
 Ort, Verlag, Ausgabe: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Inhaltsverzeichnis: -
 Art der Begutachtung: -
 Identifikatoren: Anderer: 2007/14
 Art des Abschluß: -

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