日本語
 
Help Privacy Policy ポリシー/免責事項
  詳細検索ブラウズ

アイテム詳細

  On Probation. An Experimental Analysis

Engel, C., Hennig-Schmidt, H., Irlenbusch, B., & Kube, S. (2009). On Probation. An Experimental Analysis.

Item is

基本情報

表示: 非表示:
資料種別: 成果報告書

ファイル

表示: ファイル

関連URL

表示:
非表示:
説明:
-
OA-Status:

作成者

表示:
非表示:
 作成者:
Engel, Christoph1, 著者           
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike1, 著者           
Irlenbusch, Bernd1, 著者           
Kube, Sebastian1, 著者           
所属:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

内容説明

表示:
非表示:
キーワード: -
 要旨: Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.

資料詳細

表示:
非表示:
言語:
 日付: 2009
 出版の状態: 出版
 ページ: -
 出版情報: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 目次: -
 査読: -
 識別子(DOI, ISBNなど): その他: 2009/38
 学位: -

関連イベント

表示:

訴訟

表示:

Project information

表示:

出版物

表示: