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  Maverick – Making Sense of a Conjecture of Antitrust Policy in the Lab

Engel, C., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Maverick – Making Sense of a Conjecture of Antitrust Policy in the Lab.

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 Creators:
Engel, Christoph1, Author           
Ockenfels, Axel1, Author           
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: Antitrust authorities all over the world are concerned if a particularly aggressive competitor, a "maverick", is bought out of the market. Yet there is a lack of theoretical justification. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pretest, we classify participants by their social value orientation. Individuals who are rivalistic in an allocation task indeed bid more aggressively in a laboratory oligopoly market. This disciplines incumbents. In our setting, this does not create sufficient incentives for buying out mavericks, though.

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 Dates: 2013
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2013/14
 Degree: -

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