English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
Add to Basket
 Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary
  Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help

Fischer, S., Grechenig, K., & Meier, N. (2013). Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help.

Item is

 

show all hide all

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6DF6-B Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6DF7-9
Genre: Paper

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2013_06online.pdf (Preprint)
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Fischer, Sven1, Author              
Grechenig, Kristoffel1, Author              
Meier, Nicolas, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information and under a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. We nd that (1) centralization by itself does not improve cooperation and welfare compared to an informal, peer-to-peer punishment regime and (2) centralized punishment is equally sensitive to noise as decentralized punishment, that is, it leads to signi cantly lower cooperation and welfare (total pro ts). Our results shed critical light on the widespread conjecture that the centralization of punishment institutions is welfare increasing in itself.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2013
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2013/06
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show