English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
 
 
DownloadE-Mail
  The State’s Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property

Grechenig, K., & Kolmar, M. (2011). The State’s Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Description:
-
OA-Status:
Description:
-
OA-Status:

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Grechenig, Kristoffel1, Author           
Kolmar, Martin, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the “shadow” of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2011
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2011/24
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show