English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
 
 
DownloadE-Mail
  Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt – A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty over Contributions

Grechenig, K., Nicklisch, A., & Thöni, C. (2010). Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt – A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty over Contributions.

Item is

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586775 (Any fulltext)
Description:
-
OA-Status:
Description:
-
OA-Status:

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Grechenig, Kristoffel1, Author           
Nicklisch, Andreas1, Author           
Thöni, Christian, Author
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: Under a great variety of legally relevant circumstances, people have to decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce pro-social behavior. Experimental evidence on voluntary public good provision shows that the option to punish others substantially improves cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people reveal a high willingness to punish even if their information about cooperation rates is inaccurate, or noisy. If there is some non-trivial degree of noise, unishment (1) cannot maintain high contributions and (2) reduces welfare even below the level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is crucial for he efficiency of sanction mechanisms. If a situation is characterized by low information accuracy, precluding sanctions can be optimal.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2010
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2010/11
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show