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  The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling

Hellwig, M. (2006). The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling.

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Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E6A-1 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E6B-0
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 Creators:
Hellwig, Martin1, Author              
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the .nal allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satis.es a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.

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 Dates: 2006
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: 47
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2006/21
 Degree: -

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