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  The Short Arm of Guilt – An Experiment on Group Identity and Guilt Aversion

Morell, A. (2014). The Short Arm of Guilt – An Experiment on Group Identity and Guilt Aversion.

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 Creators:
Morell, Alexander1, Author              
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: Guilt Aversion, Social Identity, Beliefs, Generosity, Experiment, Psychological Game Theory
 Abstract: In a laboratory experiment, I test whether guilt aversion, i.e., a preference to fulfill the expectations of others, plays out more strongly if agents share an induced social identity. Participants play a dictator game in which they can condition their amount sent on recipients’ beliefs. Dictators either play with a recipient from their own group (ingroup treatment) or from the other group (outgroup treatment). I find that the positive influence of second-order beliefs on how much a dictator sends is stronger in the ingroup treatment. However, the way dictators react to very high expectations does not differ significantly between treatments. In contrast to previous work I do not find that amounts sent are an inversely u-shaped function of recipients’ expectations. Rather, and independently of the treatment, participants tend to ignore very high expectations.

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 Dates: 2018-0520142014
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2014/19
 Degree: -

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