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  Reciprocity and status in a virtual field experiment

Nicklisch, A., & Salz, T. (2008). Reciprocity and status in a virtual field experiment.

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 Creators:
Nicklisch, Andreas1, Author              
Salz, Tobias1, Author              
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: <p>This article reports on a field study that has been conducted in the online computer game World of Warcraft. In a basic labor situation a principal gives an upfront wage to an agent (who is unaware that he is participating in an experiment) and asks him to conduct a real-effort task. The unique characteristic of the virtual world allows us to control for agents&rsquo; abilities to perform the task and to manipulate the principal&rsquo;s social status. Confirming gift exchange theory, generous wages indeed increase agents&rsquo; efforts, even controlling for agents&rsquo; abilities, while the principals&rsquo; social status influences effort provision probability substantially. We interpret this result such that agents assess the kindness of the wages with respect to the expected principals&rsquo; wealth.</p>

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 Dates: 2008
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2008/37
 Degree: -

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