English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT
Add to Basket
 Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary
  Does Political Representation through Parties Decrease Voters' Acceptance of Decisions?

Towfigh, E. V., Glöckner, A., Goerg, S. J., Leifeld, P., Kurschilgen, C., Llorente-Saguer, A., et al. (2013). Does Political Representation through Parties Decrease Voters' Acceptance of Decisions?

Item is

 

show all hide all

Basic

show hide
Item Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FB4-4 Version Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FB5-2
Genre: Paper

Files

show Files

Locators

show
hide
Locator:
http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2013_10online.pdf (Preprint)
Description:
-

Creators

show
hide
 Creators:
Towfigh, Emanuel Vahid1, Author              
Glöckner, Andreas1, Author              
Goerg, Sebastian J.1, Author              
Leifeld, Philip1, Author              
Kurschilgen, Carlos1, Author              
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol1, Author              
Bade, Sophie1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

Content

show
hide
Free keywords: -
 Abstract: Are decisions by political parties more or less accepted than direct-democratic decisions? The literature on parties as brand names or labels suggests that the existence of political parties lowers information and transaction costs of voters by providing ideological packages. Building on this important argument, we posit that this informational rationale for parties is not universally applicable and is contingent on the context of the decision that is made. Intermediary political decision-making institutions may impose additional costs on voters in situations where the decision is perceived to be personally important to the individual voter. We conduct an experimental online vignette study to substantiate these claims. The results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy, conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate, is optimal with regard to acceptance of a decision.

Details

show
hide
Language(s):
 Dates: 2013
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2013/10
 Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source

show