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  Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance

Traxler, C. (2009). Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance.

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 Creators:
Traxler, Christian1, Author              
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.

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 Dates: 2009
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2009/22
 Degree: -

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