Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination

Weinschenk, Philipp

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Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination

Weinschenk, P. (2011). Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FDC-C Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FDD-A

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2011_13online.pdf (Preprint) Open Access status unknown

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Creators:
Weinschenk, Philipp¹, Author

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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Abstract: We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We investigate how limited liability or the threat of sabotage influences the team’s problem. It is further shown that players who earn higher wages can be worse off than teammates with lower wages and that present-biased preferences can mitigate procrastination.

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Dates: Date issued: 2011

Publication Status: Issued

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Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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Identifiers: Other: 2011/13

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