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  Strategic Trustworthiness via Non-Strategic Third-Party Reward – An Experiment

Zhurakhovska, L. (2014). Strategic Trustworthiness via Non-Strategic Third-Party Reward – An Experiment.

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 Creators:
Zhurakhovska, Lilia1, Author           
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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Free keywords: strong indirect reciprocity, third-party reward, trust game, norms, experiment
 Abstract: In modern societies more and more people interact with strangers in one-shot situations. In these situations it might be difficult to trust others. Yet, trust is an essential component of most economic interactions. In this paper (in a one-shot situation) an impartial third party can reward another stranger for being trustworthy towards another unrelated person. By design the reward is costly and cannot be strategically motivated. Subjects strategically increase their trustworthiness towards others if they can anticipate to be rewarded for such behavior by an impartial third party. Impartial third parties reward trustworthiness irrespective of whether it can be anticipated.

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 Dates: 2017-012014
 Publication Status: Published in print
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: -
 Identifiers: Other: 2014/06
 Degree: -

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