Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games: An 
experimental study

Büchner, Susanne; Gonzalez, Luis G.; Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games: An experimental study

Büchner, S., Gonzalez, L. G., Güth, W., & Levati, V. (2004). Incentive contracts versus trust in three-person ultimatum games: An experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 673-694.

Item is Released

show all hide all

Basic

show hide

Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-70B8-2 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-70B9-F

Genre: Journal Article

Files

show Files

Locators

show

Creators

show

hide

Creators:
Büchner, Susanne¹, Author
Gonzalez, Luis G., Author
Güth, Werner¹, Author
Levati, Vittoria, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

Content

show

Details

show

hide

Language(s):

Dates: Date issued: 2004

Publication Status: Issued

Pages: -

Publishing info: -

Table of Contents: -

Rev. Type: Peer

Identifiers: -

Degree: -

Event

show

Legal Case

show

Project information

show

Source 1

show

hide

Title: European Journal of Political Economy

Source Genre: Journal

Creator(s):

Affiliations:

Publ. Info: -

Pages: - Volume / Issue: 20 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 673 - 694 Identifier: -