No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and 
collusion

Grechenig, Kristoffel; Sekyra, Michael

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No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion

Grechenig, K., & Sekyra, M. (2011). No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion. International Review of Law and Economics (IRLE), 31, 16-20.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-72A0-6 Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-72A1-4

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Grechenig, Kristoffel¹, Author
Sekyra, Michael, Author

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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Date issued: 2011

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

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Title: International Review of Law and Economics (IRLE)

Source Genre: Journal

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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 31 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 16 - 20 Identifier: -