Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry

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Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry

Hellwig, M. (2001). Risk Aversion and Incentive Compatibility with Ex Post Information Asymmetry. Economic Theory, 18, 415-438.

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Item Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-732F-F Version Permalink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-7330-9

Genre: Journal Article

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Creators:
Hellwig, Martin¹, Author

Affiliations:
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688

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Dates: Date issued: 2001

Publication Status: Issued

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Rev. Type: Peer

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Degree: -

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Title: Economic Theory

Source Genre: Journal

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Publ. Info: -

Pages: - Volume / Issue: 18 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 415 - 438 Identifier: -