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  Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion

Traxler, C. (2009). Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion. Public Choice, 140, 43-58.

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Traxler, Christian1, Author              
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1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society, ou_2173688              

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 Abstract: This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich.

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 Dates: 2009
 Publication Status: Published in print
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 Rev. Type: Peer
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Title: Public Choice
Source Genre: Journal
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 140 Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: 43 - 58 Identifier: -